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Individual Option Prices for Climate Change Mitigation 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 The willingness of the voting public to incur substantial costs in order to prevent climate 
change will be a key determinant of the success or failure of domestic and international climate 
policy. Consequently, it is important to gain some understanding about how individuals 
formulate subjective conceptions of future climate prospects in the absence of mitigation, and 
how these opinions translate into willingness to pay for climate change mitigation in terms of 
higher prices or taxes. 
 Global climate change does seem to have the potential to result in detectable shifts in the 
distributions of many environmental measures.  Past scientific controversy over the nature and 
magnitude of these changes, however, has made it very difficult for legislators to agree on 
optimal climate change policies.  Some constituencies cannot even agree on the necessity for 
costly measures to mitigate climate change.  In democratic jurisdictions, support for legislation 
to manage the world's climate depends on the distribution in the population of individuals' ex 
ante willingness to pay to avoid the perceived consequences of failing to act.  Citizens are asked 
to vote on policies (directly or indirectly) in advance of knowing the resolution of uncertainty 
about what will happen if nothing is done.1  
 What do people perceive to be the consequences of pursuing no special policies to 
manage the world's climate?   Individuals who have lived for some time in a particular location 
have become accustomed to the typical patterns of seasonal temperatures, rainfall, cloud cover, 
                     
    1 Some early research on the topic of how people make judgments in the presence of uncertainty is described in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
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and humidity in their local area.  Absent any appreciation of the forces that might produce 
systematic changes in these climate variables, individuals may assume that the current average 
patterns will persist indefinitely.  Other people have begun to recognize that, without policies to 
prevent these changes, shifts in the distributions of their local climate variables may occur. 
 Cameron and Englin (1997) make the point that in stated preference assessment of the 
demand for a public good, subjects who are queried about their willingness pay for the provision 
of the good will approach the question with two types of information.  First, they are likely to 
have different amounts of native information (prior knowledge or past experience with the 
type of good in question).  Second, the researcher will typically provide additional information 
about the nature of the good in an effort to induce the subject to respond on the ideal basis of 
full information as prescribed by Arrow, et al. (1993).  Researchers will sometimes proceed on 
the assumption that the information provided in the survey itself represents the complete 
information set upon which individuals are making their policy choices.  Here, we delve further 
into the issue of heterogeneous subjective information. 
 In a separate paper, Cameron (2002), we describe models intended to capture the nature 
of the opinion-updating process as survey respondents are exposed to external information about 
the probable future state of the world's climate.  The present paper focuses on an analysis of the 
same subjects willingness to pay to prevent climate change.  This willingness to pay is elicited 
using a referendum-type stated preference question (Arrow, et al. (1993)). 
 The objective of this analysis is modest.  We wish to set forth a simple illustration that 
captures the most important features of any model intended to measure the social benefits of 
climate change mitigation:  individual subjective uncertainty and estimation in terms of option 
prices formally derived from a common underlying indirect utility function that allows for 
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heterogeneous preferences across individuals.  The importance of incorporating these features is 
illustrated using a convenience sample, rather than a representative population sample, so further 
research is clearly warranted.  We find that individual support for climate change mitigation 
programs depends not only on the anticipated scope of climate change, but also on the 
individuals degree of uncertainty about this scope.  Furthermore, the effects of scope and 
uncertainty are not constant across individuals, but vary systematically with a number of 
sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics. 
 How does this line of inquiry differ from the existing literature on climate change 
mitigation benefits?  An early study that prompted much discussion in the literature was 
Mendelsohn, et al. (1994).  These authors use county-level data on farmland prices for the US to 
develop a detailed climate and agriculture model.  They control for non-climatic variables 
(including population density, latitude, altitude, and physical properties of the land in each 
county) and focus on the effects of interpolated county-level 30-year averages for normal daily 
mean temperature and normal monthly precipitation for January, April, July, and October.  Their 
cropland models suggest annual damages on the order of 4-5% of gross farm income.  Their crop 
revenue models, however, suggest about a 1% gain in revenue.  However, scientifically 
forecasted climate changes and econometrically forecasted changes in agricultural revenues or 
cropland values are not necessarily an accurate or complete measure of the average citizens 
perceptions of the climate problem and their willingness to support policies that will end up 
costing them money. 
 Work by Layton and Brown (2000) is much more relevant to the present study, although 
it still deals with only one type of climate change impact.  These authors also use stated 
preference techniques, in this case to value a range of potential forest losses due to climate 
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change.  The program choices that were presented to respondents differed randomly in the level 
of forest loss that would ensue, whether forest management activities were involved, whether 
climate change abatement was included, and in the cost of the programs.  Random parameters 
logit models were employed to ascertain that willingness to pay to prevent forest loss of different 
extents and over two different time horizons.  Layton and Levine (2002) also employ the data 
from the Layton and Brown study but use a novel hierarchical Bayesian model to focus on the 
questions of scope effects (i.e. the idea that differing expectations about future climate 
conditions should produce a different willingness to pay to prevent climate change) and 
individual discount rates for climate change policy choices. 
 The present paper differs from Mendelsohn, et al. (1994), Layton and Brown (2000) and 
Layton and Levine (2002) in that demand for climate change mitigation is modeled as a derived 
demand for the control of future annual average temperatures in the respondents region.  We 
focus on the individual respondents perceptions about this underlying climate variable, rather 
than on market or non-market demands for just some subset of climate services, such as 
agriculture or the maintenance of forest ecosystems.  In addition, we emphasize the fact that, for 
many people, there is likely to be uncertainty about future climate conditions.  In addition to 
verifying the existence of simple scope effects, we explore for the presence of uncertainty 
effects. When peoples perceptions about climate change differ, both in terms of mean and 
variance, do these differences show up in their willingness to support climate change mitigation 
programs? 
 Section 2 reviews (in the general case) the modeling of option prices for environmental 
protection in the context of discrete-choice stated preference survey data.  Uncertainty is 
captured by crude measures of the moments of respondents subjective probability density 
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functions for just one representative continuous dimension of future environmental quality:  
average annual temperatures in the respondents region.  Section 3 gives a concrete example in 
terms of a particular simple functional form for state-dependent individual indirect utility.  
Section 4 describes a convenience sample of college student data that allows the basic model to 
be tested, and Section 5 discusses the empirical results based on these data.  Section 6 outlines 
some illustrative simulations that are possible using the estimated model, and Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  A Generic Model 
 Suppose we are interested in determining an ex ante measure of the social value of 
preventing a deterioration in environmental quality.  (In our application, environmental quality 
will refer to regional climate conditions.)  Suppose initially that environmental quality can be 
conveniently summarized (in just one dimension) as the level of a continuous variable, .  For 
example, in the context of climate change, one could think of t as annual average temperatures.   
t
 Assume that if mitigation is undertaken (at known cost), environmental quality at the 
current level, t , is guaranteed.  If society fails to mitigate, the level of environmental quality is 
likely to worsen, but individuals are subjectively uncertain as to the extent of this deterioration.
*
2 
 From the point of view of a single individual, let this uncertain future outcome--in the absence 
of intervention--be t .  When called upon to make an evaluation about whether to undertake 
mitigation efforts, individuals decide whether or not to pay to prevent environmental degradation 
based on their current perceived distribution for , which we will label t ( )f t .  The way in which 
individuals formulate their own subjective distributions for  (partly in response to information t
                     
2 Arrow (1982) compares notions of risk perception in the disciplines of psychology and economics. 
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from external sources) is one of the main issues in an associated paper (Cameron (2002)), but 
discussion of this topic will be minimized in the present paper. 
 
a.) General Discussion of Option Prices from Referendum Stated Preference Responses 
 Under uncertainty, the appropriate measure of the social value of preventing 
environmental deterioration from t  to t  is the option price (OP) for this change.  An option 
price in this context is that one common certain payment (an amount to be paid regardless of 
which way the uncertainty is resolved) that yields the same expected utility as the set of 
(differing) payments that would be separately optimal for each possible state of the world if it 
occurred with certainty.
*
3  The economic theory concerning option prices is very familiar in the 
case of uncertainty over only two possible states of the world.  (See for example, Graham (1981), 
or an empirical adaptation in an environmental economics context by Cameron and Englin 
(1997).)  Identical intuition can be brought to bear on a problem with a continuum of possible 
states of the world, where uncertainty is represented by a continuous probability density 
function, rather than simply the discrete probabilities of an event and its complement. 
 In order to estimate option prices empirically, it is expedient to work with a class of 
indirect utility functions that is additively separable in some monotonic function of income, 
. Indirect utility is also affected by , a function of the realized level of environmental 
quality, t , and other individual-specific factors, x.  Ex ante, individual subjective uncertainty 
exists across states of the world (environmental quality outcomes), represented by different 
values of .  However, for any one state, the individual can be modeled as having state-
( )g Y ( , )h t x
t
                     
3 Of course, economists have noted that expected utility theory is not adequate to explain every economic decision 
under uncertainty.  It is, however, a conventional theoretical starting point that appears well suited to the present 
application. See Machina (1987) for a simple overview of some competing theories. 
 
6 
 
  7
dependent4 utility level V  if they elect to pay an offered amount, , in order to preserve 
environmental quality at current level .  If they do not pay, environmental quality will 
deteriorate to the uncertain level , distributed 
1 c
*t
t ( )f t
(
( )
Y c
Y
, which allows a utility level of only V .  An 
additive normal error term facilitates econometric estimation. 
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The individual will prefer to pay amount , and thereby to preserve current environmental 
quality t , if  is positive, i.e. if 
c
* 1 0(V V−
 )* 0 1 0( ( , ) ( ,V V g c g Y x h t x ε ε − − − >   (2) 0.
)
If one particular value of t  was to occur with certainty, the individual's maximum willingness to 
pay (  for preventing environmental deterioration from  to specific level  could be found 
by setting (  to zero and solving for , which will of course differ with t .  Simplify by 
letting 
)WTP *t t
1 0V V−
0 1
*
tc
ε ε ε−=  and solve for  follows: 
 {
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t
t
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ε
ε
−
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 − 
= − − +
 (3) }
An ex post measure of consumer welfare, across all possible states of the world -- usually 
called the "expected surplus"--could then be calculated by computing the probability-weighted 
average of these state-dependent WTP values, namely, the expectation over t : 
t
                     
4 We use the term "state-dependent" in the same sense as it is used in Hirshleifer and Riley (1992).  Preferences 
differ across the uncertain outcomes (states of the world), but only because the state of the world is an argument of 
a more-general specification of the individual's utility function. 
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{ }
{ }
* 1 1 * 0
1 1 * 0
( ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
t t tE c E Y g g Y h t x h t x
Y g g Y h t x h t x f t d
ε
ε
−
−
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
)
 (4) 
 
When explicit functional forms have been selected for ,  and , this integral can typically 
be simplified. 
g 1h 0h
 However, this ex post measure is not appropriate for ex ante policy decisions.  The option 
price (  is the preferred measure, and is defined by: )OP
  (5) 1 * 0( , ) ( ) ( , ) (V Y OP t f t dt V Y t f t dt− =∫ ∫
or, identically, 
 
 { }1 * 0( , ) ( , ) ( )V Y OP t V Y t f t dt 0− −∫ =  (6) 
 
Substituting the generic expression for the indirect utility difference (from equation (2) into  
(6)) yields: 
 { }1 * 0( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )g Y OP g Y h t x h t x f t dtε − − + − + = ∫ 0  (7) 
Solving this equation for OP  yields the desired option price.  One can simplify the notation by 
using  to denote an expectation over states of the world t . [ ]tE ⋅
 1 * 0( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( , ) ( , )t tg Y OP f t dt E g Y E h t x h t x ε − = − − + ∫  (8) 
 
This analysis cannot be taken much further without committing to a specific functional form, 
especially for the function .  Thus, we proceed in the next section to adopt one simple 
concrete assumption for an empirically tractable functional form. 
( )g Y
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3.  Example:  A Specific Functional Form 
 We require a simple functional form for the state-dependent indirect utility function that 
exhibits risk aversion and therefore allows ex ante option prices to differ from the ex post 
expected surplus measures.  One such model is linear in the logarithm of income.  Since t  differs 
across the mitigate/don't-mitigate stated preference scenarios concerning climate change, indirect 
utility can be linear in .  However, we also desire to allow the dispersion of the respondent's 
subjective distribution of future environmental quality to affect option prices.  It is therefore 
expedient to allow indirect utility to depend upon the squared deviation between realized t  and 
its ex ante expected value, 
t
[ ]E t .  A simple and tractable specific form for the model is therefore: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) [ ]( )
21 * * * *
0 0 1
20 0
0 0 1
, log( )
, log( )
V Y c t Y c t t E t
V Y t Y t t E t
1β δ δ
β δ δ ε
 − = − + + − + 
= + + − +
ε
 (9) 
 
This symmetric loss function, for departures from , still leaves something to be desired, but 
it is a useful and tractable starting point.  The utility-difference function, which also depends on 
the uncertain outcome with respect to t , is then: 
[ ]E t
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( ){ } (2 21 0 * * * 1 00 0 1log / .V V Y c Y t t t E t t E t )β δ δ ε − = − + − + − − − + −     ε  (10) 
In practice, each of the indirect utility parameters in this specification can be expressed as a 
systematic function of observable (exogenous) respondent attributes, in order to allow for 
heterogeneity in preferences. For example, we might let 0 0 ' xβ β= , 0 0 ' xδ δ=  and 1 1 ' xδ δ= , 
where the vector x  may differ across these three systematic varying parameters.  Also let 
1 0ε ε ε= − .  Note that if  can be assumed to be certain, the term *t ( )( )*t E t− 2*  is conveniently 
zero. 
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a.) Option Prices from Referendum Stated Preference Responses 
 As in the generic case, OP is the common certain payment that has the same expected 
utility as no payment and no mitigation (or the same expected utility as the set of each of the 
separately optimal payments under each possible outcome with certainty).  The binary probit 
discrete choice model (to be used to estimate OP) is based on the expectation of the utility 
difference across all possible outcomes for t .  For the simple indirect utility difference 
specification illustrated above, this expectation takes the form: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) [ ]( ){ } ( )
0
1 0
0
*
0
2 2* *
1
log /
t
E V V Y c Y
t t f t dt
t E t t E t f t dt
β
δ
δ ε
 − = −   
+ −
 + − − − 
∫
∫ +
 (11) 
If we assume that with mitigation, the current level of environmental quality can be sustained 
with certainty, this can be simplified as follows: 
 
( ) [ ]{ }
[ ]( ){ } ( )
0
1 0 *
0 0
2
1
log /
t
E V V Y c Y t E t
t E t f t dt
β δ
δ ε
 − = − + −   
+ − − +∫
 (12) 
Since the remaining expression involving an integral is simply the negative of the variance of t , 
the discrete choice probit "index" expression is thus a linear-in-parameters function of the 
indirect utility function parametersthe three scalars (or possibly systematically varying 
parameters consisting of the inner products of parameter vectors and exogenous variables) 
0
0β , 
0δ , and 1δ :
5   
                     
5 Note that in the current empirical application,  is invariant. *t
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 ( ) [ ]{ } [ ]{ }1 0 *0 0 1log /tE V V Y c Y t E t Var tβ δ δ − = − + − + − +    ε  (13) 
 
 For a sample of survey respondents, we can now provide an inventory of the data 
required in order to estimate the model.  The dependent variable is the discrete YES/NO 
response to the willingness to pay for mitigation question.  Explanatory variables must be 
constructed from data on income, , the referendum offered value, , the certain level of 
environmental quality with mitigation t , and individual characteristics 
Y c
* x , which can be allowed 
to shift each of the three basic utility parameters.  The key explanatory variables capturing 
scope are constructed from the mean and the variance of the individual's subjective 
distribution concerning future environmental quality in the absence of mitigation:   and 
.  Approximations for each of these variables are elicited from each respondent in our 
survey.  One insight is that the precise shape of this subjective environmental quality 
distribution, 
[ ]E t
[ ]Var t
( )f t , can apparently be individual-specific and take any valid form.  Only the mean 
and the variance of this distribution affect the expected utility difference under this specification, 
which is a convenient artifact of this functional form. 
 The model, as specified above, is linear in parameters.  If  and Var  are treated as 
ordinary explanatory variables, a conventional packaged maximum likelihood probit algorithm 
can be used to estimate the unknown parameters.  Note that the intercept should be suppressed.   
[ ]E t [ ]t
 To solve the estimated probit discrete choice model for option prices in this concrete 
example, recall that OP  is the value of c  that makes the expected utility difference exactly zero. 
 Substituting OP  for c  (and simplifying the notation to highlight the essentials), the OP  
equation, for each individual, will take the following form: 
 ( )0 1 0 0 log / ,tE V V Y OP Y Aβ ε − = − + +     (14) 
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where [ ]{ } [ ]{ }*0 1A t E t Var tδ δ= − + − .  Setting the expected indirect utility-difference equal to 
zero and solving for OP  yields [ ]0exp ( ) /Y AOP Y ε β= − − + .  Note that the error term ought to 
be carried throughout this process.  Calculating a fitted value for an individual's OP  involves 
taking the expectation of this formula over the implicit probit error term ε (which is assumed, as 
usual, to be distributed normally with mean zero and variance one).  The expectation of OP  for 
each individual is given by: 
 { } ( ) ( )( )20exp / exp 1/ 2E OP Y Y A β= − − 0β  (15) 
In the discussion of the empirical results later in this paper, we will also refer to the quantity 
{ }E OP  as willingness to pay . ( )WTP
  
4.  A Modest Sample of Data 
 After two rounds of pretests, a pencil-and-paper questionnaire was distributed to Summer 
Session undergraduate economics classes.  Students received a five minute introduction to the 
survey during the lecture period and were requested to return the completed survey by the next 
lecture.6   A second round of sampling was conducted in two classes in the Fall quarter of that 
same year, and a third round of sampling, using similar classes, took place during the subsequent 
Fall quarter.  Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the estimating sample.   
                     
6  The Summer Session 1977 samples employed no incentives and yielded a rather low response rate, as expected. 
 The Fall 1997 (SMPL2)  and Fall 1998 (SMPL3) samples were collected in the authors own Principles of 
Economics classes and Applied Regression Analysis classes.  In these courses, the survey was integrated into the 
instruction in segments concerning the non-market valuation of public goods and the application of nonlinear 
simultaneous equations and probit models.  Nominal extra credit was attached to submitting an anonymous survey 
and a detached receipt with the students name and section number.  This protocol was designed to preserve 
anonymity yet reward participation. The number of surveys collected was only slightly smaller than the number of 
receipts turned in, and only a handful of submitted survey instruments were turned in blank.  Given the 
exploratory nature of the sample, we obviously did not (and could not) pursue non-respondents.   
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 This is undeniably a sample of convenience so it would be heroic to attempt to 
extrapolate the findings from this sample concerning mean option prices to the population as a 
whole.  Nevertheless, this sample can be used to demonstrate that there can be systematic 
differences across individuals in perceptions about future climate conditions and that these 
different perceptions can influence willingness to pay for climate change mitigation.  Any given 
group of college students can be different from the population as a whole, but the extent to 
which they differ may depend upon the type of college, the students majors, or the courses they 
are taking when surveyed.  The most important differences are likely to be age- or cohort-
related.  7, 8  
 An anonymous referee has summed up some of the issues:  college students are the age 
group closest to adult status that are also most likely to be living at the time we see effects of 
these policies.  Thus, under this view they are the ones that should be answering these questions. 
 A key caveat is that if the votes are taken by all today and cost experienced today, we must 
reflect others views as well. 
 
a.  Data on Respondents' Opinions about Future Environmental Conditions 
 A preliminary task in this study involves establishing the determinants of the moments of 
                     
7   Harrison and Lesley (1996), however, find that an inexpensive student sample yields essentially identical results 
to those provided by litigation-quality research in the Exxon Valdez case. 
8
 Using data from another study (Cameron, et al. (2002)), we have created a dummy variable for the youngest 
19- to 25-year age group (2.3% of the 1737 people in the sample), and separately for the 19- to 29-year age group 
(6.7% of the sample).  These dummy variables were allowed to shift both the intercept and the slope of the implicit 
willingness-to-pay function, for the best model in that study.  For the 19-25 group, the intercept term was 
statistically significantly different but only at the 10% level.  The slope term was not statistically different.  When 
the 19-29 group is distinguished from the rest, the intercept term is not statistically different, but the slope term is 
significantly different, although only just at the 10% level.  Perhaps due to the small numbers of youths in these 
two different subsamples, these tests are inconclusive as to whether WTP for environmental non-market goods 
differs significantly from that of adults. 
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the individual's revised subjective distribution for future environmental quality (average annual 
temperatures): [ ]E t  and [ ]Var .  There has been substantial policy interest in recent years in the 
topic of risk communication (e.g. Davies, et al. (1987)).  This literature focuses on the best way 
to convey to individuals the true objective magnitudes of risks.
t
9  There has been less attention 
devoted to the problem of eliciting subjective probabilities.  Reliable elicitation of (at least) the 
means and variances of subjective probability distributions is crucial to this analysis.10 
 In economics, the topics of (i.) individuals' risk perceptions, (ii.) how these risk 
perceptions respond to information, and (iii.) the value of risk changes, have been fertile areas 
for research.  Some representative studies include Smith and Desvousges (1987), Smith and 
Desvousges (1988), Smith and Johnson (1988), Viscusi (1985), Viscusi (1985), Viscusi and 
Magat (1992), Viscusi, et al. (1986), and Viscusi and O'Connor (1984).  In almost all cases, 
however, the risks under consideration are physical health or workplace risks.  But "risk" can be 
defined more broadly to include preferences over uncertain outcomes more generally. 
 For climate change, the variable that we designate to illustrate the uncertainty is annual 
average temperature during a decade twenty years into the future.  At the beginning of the 
survey, we elicit from the respondent their initial assumptions about the future distribution of the 
 variable.  Historical data are provided for the weather station nearest the respondent.  
Provision of this information insures that the respondent is making his or her forecast for the 
expected value and dispersion of future mean temperatures (for the decade of 2011-2020) based 
on valid current data.   
t
 After establishing the true local annual average temperature, we first elicit information on 
                     
9 The issue of long-term environmental risks is addressed in Fischhoff (1990). 
10 Benson, et al. (1995) address the role of belief assessment in the process of eliciting probabilities. 
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the mean and dispersion of the individual's native subjective distribution for future 
environmental quality.  Expected values seem relatively easy to elicit.  It is more difficult to ask 
respondents to convey information on variances.  For dispersion measures, we have elected to 
ask for "plus" and "minus" amounts relative to their expected value (and described as a 95% 
range), and then to interpret this as four standard deviations, squaring 0.25 times this amount to 
yield a variance approximation. 
 Once these prior distributions have been established, the respondent is presented with 
information describing the distributions of future average temperatures (purportedly) forecasted 
by government scientists and by environmental groups.11  One objective of the larger study was 
to discriminate among the effects of different external information sources on the respondent's 
distributional updating process.  The design of the different survey versions ensures that there is 
orthogonal variation across respondents in these purported external forecasts. 
 After the external information on future climate has been provided, respondents are 
invited to update their priors on the distribution of future annual average temperatures, giving 
both a new expected value and a new 95% range (which we convert to a variance, again 
invoking strong distributional assumptions).  In the present paper, these updated posterior 
distributions constitute the information set used by respondents at the moment they make their 
stated choice about climate change policy. A thorough analysis of the updating process from 
native priors to posterior distributions is contained in Cameron (2002).  To the extent that there 
is heterogeneity in this updating process, changes in population characteristics can be expected 
                     
11 This information is part of the experimental design of the survey.  All stylized forecasts fall within the range of 
assorted actual forecasts.  Concerning survey research ethics, there is the delicate matter of not lying to 
respondents.  Since we are purposefully vague about the precisely which "government scientists" and 
"environmental groups" have made these forecasts, there may be some natural attenuation of the credibility 
assigned by respondents to these opinions.  Respondents were debriefed after the sample period. 
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to alter the way external information is combined with priors to generate the posterior 
information used in policy choices.  In the present paper, however, we take these posterior 
distributions as given and explore their effects on stated climate policy choices. 
    
b.)  Data on Willingness to Pay to Prevent Climate Change 
 No established markets exist for the mitigation of climate change.  Furthermore, there are 
few opportunities to invoke weak complementarity and to rely on indirect market information to 
infer implicit demands for climate change mitigation.  Despite the potential shortcomings of 
stated preference methods, direct elicitation of people's stated willingness to trade off money for 
environmental protection is likely to be the best source of information about the social value of 
climate change mitigation activity. 
 Prior to the policy choice question from which we attempt to infer valuation, the survey 
respondent has been asked their opinion about climate change prospects in terms of average 
annual temperatures in their regions.  However, we also invite respondents to consider the 
implications for a variety of climate services of an arbitrary four-degree (Fahrenheit) average 
temperature increase.  Demand for climate services give rise to derived demand for climate 
change mitigation.  These effects on climate services are captured by questions concerning 
heating costs, air-conditioning costs, personal comfort, food prices, severity of storms, frequency 
of storms, frequency of droughts, water consumption [prices], housing prices, sea levels, tropical 
diseases, welfare of the poorest 50% of US residents, and welfare of the poorest 50% of the 
world's population.  Having explored with the respondent the anticipated consequences of failing 
to prevent a standardized temperature increase, we then review the respondent's probable budget 
constraint over the relevant future period.  We elicit expected annual income categories (in 1997 
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dollars) for the year 2005 and the year 2020.  The proposed policy is described as follows: 
 
 Suppose that policy-makers have identified a set of domestic and international 
environmental regulations and incentives.  If put into place, these policies will prevent 
any detectible change in your regional climate so that average temperatures will 
continue, indefinitely, to be much as they were during 1987-1996.  In other words, 
putting these policies in place would allow society to avoid any of the consequences (bad 
or good) to be expected if we do nothing.  
 
 
 The monthly costs of the policy are assigned randomly, in ten different amounts,  
presented in the following form: 
 
 Suppose that these policies will mean higher prices and/or higher taxes so that by the 
year 2000, your monthly household costs will be higher by $______ (in 1997 dollars) for 
as long as these policies are followed.   
 
The offered amounts were uniformly distributed across the values $5, $10, $15, $20, $30, $50, 
$75, $100, $125, and $150 in the first installments of the survey.  Initial analyses showed a 
disproportionate number of respondents saying yes, even to the highest amounts.   For the final 
wave of the survey, the  $5, $15 and $30 bids were discontinued and were replaced by bids of 
$35, $200, and $300.12 
 Respondents are then asked if they would vote in favor of this package of policies, given 
their expected income and these costs.  They are then probed to detect "protest bids."  The last 
part of the survey collects sociodemographic and attitudinal variables, including the respondent's 
perceptions of bias (for or against the policy) on the part of the research team. 
 The basic option price model can be estimated using data on:  the YES/NO response to 
this question, the exogenously assigned value of monthly costs, , imposed for this respondent, c
                     
12 A handful of left-over survey instruments from the earlier wave were recycled during the final wave of the survey.  
Of these, the returns at the discontinued bids of $5, $15 and $30 were 5, 1, and 2 questionnaires, respectively. 
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information on other sociodemographic characteristics, , current environmental quality t  
(current average annual temperature, equal to 63.5 degrees Fahrenheit for everyone in this 
geographically homogeneous sample), and the values of 
s *
[ ]E t  and [ ]Var .  Table 1 provides 
variable definitions and descriptive statistics. 
t
63.5= =
− (g  ]
 
6.  Empirical Findings 
 How willing are respondents to vote in favor of the climate change mitigation policies at 
different levels of cost?  Given the microeconomic theory behind our estimating specification, 
and with sufficient confidence in stated preference information, the discrete choice probit model 
explaining stated voting behavior can be used to infer fitted estimates of individuals' option 
prices for climate change mitigation.  Table 2 displays the results from some preliminary models 
in terms of expected values (E) and variances (V) using our exploratory sample. These models 
are labeled as EV specifications. Note that  for all respondents in this 
sample.
* *E t t  
13   
 Our most basic estimating specification is derived theoretically from a utility difference 
function with three parameters (the coefficients 0β , 0δ  and 1δ  on ) /Y c Y−lo  , [E t , and 
[ ]Var t  respectively). Introducing respondent heterogeneity (potentially) generalizes each of 
these three parameters to a linear function of individual attributes.  This is how we accommodate 
preferences that differ according to the observable characteristics of different groups of 
respondents. 
                     
13
 We have employed  in our models, rather than * 63.5E t  − 
*63.5 E t −   .  This will have no substantive 
effect whatsoever in the formal linear or ad hoc quadratic models (only sign changes in some coefficients), but it 
facilitates later consideration of ad hoc logarithmic specifications. 
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 Model EV-1 is the most rudimentary specification, since it assumes homogeneous 
preferences. The initial term, lo , ought always to be important, since it captures 
both the effect of income and that of policy costs.  It is solidly significant in all the specifications 
shown in Table 2.  In Model EV-1, however, while the coefficient on 
( )g /Y c Y− 
[ ]E t  is statistically 
significant, the coefficient on the uncertainty term, [ ]Var  , is near zero and completely 
insignificant. Furthermore, no amount of experimentation with sociodemographic shifters on the 
coefficients of this model seems able to produce a robust specification wherein a linear term in 
uncertainty is solidly statistically significant.   
t
 Our theoretical model motivated the inclusion of an uncertainty term in our model, and 
the simple indirect utility function we chose for illustration leads to a linear empirical 
specification.  For welfare calculations, however, we do not need to recover the underlying 
utility function from the utility-difference specification.  It seems reasonable, then, to explore 
generalizations of our basic theoretical model that may prove to be more compatible with the 
empirical data. 
 Linear-in-variables specifications can sometimes obscure strong non-linear relationships. 
Model EV-2 in Table 2 shows the results of including squared terms in [ ]E t  and [ ]Var , as well 
as an interaction between the two (still with constant parameters).  The effect is dramatic.  In 
particular, the squared and interaction terms in variance are statistically significant at the 10% 
and 5% levels, suggesting that uncertainty is indeed a determinant of support for climate change 
mitigation policies.  The three new parameters produce a substantial and significant 
improvement in the maximized log-likelihood.  Thus, the relationship between WT  and 
t
P [ ]E t  
and [ ]Var  is not planar.  In fact, this model leads us to believe that it is a saddle-shaped t
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surface.  However, the common sense of the model must be assessed.   
 First of all, the saddle shape of the surface persists when we generalize Model EV-2 by 
allowing the parameters to vary with individual heterogeneity as in Model EV-3.  The coefficient 
on log[(Y-t)/Y] may vary with gender, and the coefficient on [ ]E t  varies with the respondents 
subjective degree of informedness.  (We preserve the interaction term between the [ ]E t  variable 
and the conservatism variable because of its marginal significance in other specifications.)  None 
of the other slope coefficients in Model EV-2 prove to be robustly heterogeneous across the 
sample.  Model EV-3 in Table 2 is our most general fully quadratic specification. 
 Model EV-3 suggests that WT  increases with the anticipated severity of climate change 
(
P
[ ]E t ) when uncertainty is low, but as uncertainty increasesinto a region where the data are 
rather thin14the effect of [ ]E t  on WT  changes sign.  This seems implausible, unless having a 
high value for 
P
[ ]E t  is correlated with some key omitted variable(s) that also influence(s) 
demand for climate change mitigation efforts.   
 There are also very few data points to support some extremely high fitted WT  implied 
by the fully quadratic model for scenarios that display little expected change in temperature but 
are high on the uncertainty dimension.  It is conceivable that in order for the quadratic form to 
adequately fit the curvature in the surface over the mass of the data, the coefficients on the 
squared and interaction terms produce these high WT  values over the sparsely populated 
domain merely as an artifact of achieving the best fit over the densely populated domain.  It 
seems we need to explore models that allow for curvature, but do not, for example, force a 
change in sign for  as uncertainty about future average temperatures increases. 
P
P
/ [ ]WTP E t∂ ∂
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 We now depart further from our initial simple theoretical model by switching from a 
dependence of WT  upon P [ ]Var  to a family of models wherein WT  depends on the precision 
of the individuals average future temperature forecast, 
t P
[ ]1/ .  This model is likely to be 
somewhat ill-behaved, however.  As the case of certainty is approached (i.e. as 
Var t
[ ]Var  goes to 
zero), this precision variable becomes undefined.  Consequently, we adopt an arbitrary 
minimally shifted model, employing 
t
[ ]( )1Var t1/ +  in order to capture the dispersion in future 
temperature forecasts without creating undefined WT  as uncertainty approaches zero.  
Attempts at models that were fully quadratic in 
P
[ ]E t  and this precision variable revealed that the 
only persistently significant terms were [ ]( )11/ Var t +  and [ ]E t .  This specification is shown in 
Table 2 as Model EV-4. 
 Qualitatively, Model EV-4 produces a fitted WT  surface where WT  is increasing in P P
[ ]E t  at low levels of [ ]E t , but decreasing in [ ]E t   at higher levels.  This still seems 
questionable, so we consider models where the deviation between current and expected future 
temperatures enter in log form.15   
 The best-fitting model in this class is Model EV-5.  Its log-likelihood value is 331.95, 
only minimally worse than Model EV-4s value of 330.94.  This slight loss in fit is the cost of 
preventing outliers from leading us to a model with implausible properties.  Squared terms in the 
[ ](log 60E t − )  variable and in the [ ]( )1Var t1/ +  prove to be statistically insignificant, and have 
                                                                  
14 The bulk of the data reside between 63.5 and 70 degrees for  and less than 9 for ]Var . [ ]E t [t
15
 A minor adjustment is made because five respondents report negative value for [ ] 63.5E t − , i.e., they expect 
average temperature to be lower in the future.  Rather than discarding these observations, we use [ ]( )log 60E t −  
instead, to ensure that we need not attempt to take the log of a negative number. 
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thus been dropped.   
 The robustness of Model EV-5 to outlying observations has been verified by dropping 26 
observations that appear to qualify as outliers in the domain of the [ ]E t  and [ ]Var  variables.  
In Figure 1, these observations have values of 
t
[ ]E t  greater than 71, values of [ ]Var  greater 
than 12 or values of 
t
[ ]Var  greater than 8 when t [ ]E t  is less than 66.  When these observations 
are dropped, Model EV-5s point estimates are only minimally affected.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term slips just below the 10% significance level, but the other parameters retain 
significance at their previous levels. Although the baseline effects of [ ]( )60−log E t  and 
[ ](1/ 1Var t + )  become statistically insignificant in Model EV-5, the interaction terms involving 
these variables remain significant, so they are retained in the model.16   
 An anonymous reviewer drew our attention to the theme in Cook and Graham (1977), 
Anderson (1979), Graham (1981) and Graham (1984) that the central element in determining the 
shape of the option price function is how the marginal utility of income changes with the events 
at risk.  This reviewer recommended that that we verify our assumed independence of the 
marginal utility of log income from the distribution of future annual average temperatures.  We 
generalized Model EV-5 to include interactions between ( )log /Y c Y−    and each of the mean 
and variance terms-- [ ]( )log 60E t −  and [ ]( )1Var t1/ + .  Neither of these interaction terms bears 
a coefficient that is individually significant and the maximized value of the log-likelihood 
improves by only 0.91 for these two additional sources of systematic variation in the marginal 
                                                                  
   
16
 The introduction of larger possible costs ($200 and $300) in the second wave of the survey instrument could 
have the potential to increase implied willingness-to-pay values since these higher values present respondents with 
an opportunity to say yes to a larger bid.  Nevertheless, there is no statistically significant shift in willingness to 
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utility of log income.  It appears that the fit of the model is not greatly compromised by assuming 
separability between income and climate effects. 
 Model EV-5 will be considered our preferred specification in this class of models.  The 
implications of this model are clearest if we use a three-dimensional plot.  Figure 1 shows the 
resulting surface.  The vertical dimension measures fitted monthly WT  in constant 1997 
dollars.  We have benchmarked this surface for an income level of $40,000 (approximately the 
average household income in 1998), despite the fact that these students optimistically expect 
their future incomes to be over $60,000 in constant 1997 dollar terms, on average.  The WT  
surface is furthermore depicted for males with neutral levels on the scales for informedness and 
conservatism.
P
P
17   The vertical scale ranges from $0 to $500.  Clearly, there are scope effects in 
willingness to pay to prevent climate change.  The greater the amount of climate change that 
respondents expect they are preventing, the more they are willing to pay.  With certainty that 
temperatures will remain just as they have been (at 63.5 degrees Fahrenheit), WT  for climate 
change mitigation programs is very small.  The more certain the respondent is about a given 
increase in average temperatures, the more he or she is willing to pay per month to prevent such 
an increase.  Uncertainty appears to dampen the effect of the scope of expected climate change 
on willingness to pay to prevent it, but even with substantial uncertainty, scope effects appear to 
remain.  Given that attempts to include squared terms in 
P
[ ]( )60−log E t  and [ ]( )1+1/  in 
Model 5 did not improve the log-likelihood, it appears that WT  is monotonic in both 
Var t
P [ ]E t  and 
[ ]Var t  over the range of our data. 
                                                                  
pay is evidenced for different waves of the survey in the family of models presented in Table 2. 
 
17
 For the reported average expected future income in this sample, the WT  value would simply be scaled 
upwards by about 50%, for an expected annual income of just over $60,000. 
P
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 Why is WTP decreasing, rather than increasing with uncertainty?  In the usual story 
about the risk premia associated with gambles, we are considering uncertainty concerning the 
level of a good (typically income).  Total utility is assumed to be increasing with income, but at a 
decreasing rate, so that the marginal utility of income is positive, but declining.  The result is that 
a positive risk premium must be added to a gamble (in terms of income) to make the individual 
indifferent between a gamble and a sure payment with the same expected value as the gamble.  
In contrast, in the climate change context, the uncertainty concerns future annual average 
temperatures.  Higher temperatures appear to be perceived, on average, as bads, rather than 
goods.  Total utility is declining in future annual average temperatures.  Marginal utility is 
negative and seems to be declining with increases in future annual average temperatures.  When 
marginal utility is negative, uncertainty is associated with a negative risk premium.  Hence, the 
greater the uncertainty about future climate, the less people are willing to pay to sustain current 
climate patterns. 
 Construct validity is an important factor in any assessment of a fitted model of WT .  
We consider the sensitivity of the shape of the WT  surface to gender, informedness about 
environmental issues, and the respondents degree of conservatism, respectively.  Female 
students are willing to pay more than males, greater informedness means greater willingness to 
pay, and greater conservatism means lower willingness to pay.  These findings are intuitively 
plausible. 
P
P
 Note that three additional variables were considered in the most extensive forms of all 
specifications discussed in this paper:  RES. BIAS (researcher bias), and SMPL2 and SMPL3 
(dummy variables for two of the main subsamples of data).  None of these three variables 
appears to have a statistically significant effect on WT  in any specification. P
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7.  Simulations 
 The estimated coefficients on the FEMALE, INFORM, and CONSERV variables convey 
the differences in the fitted WTP function for individuals with different characteristics.  We have 
also conducted a few simple simulation exercises to demonstrate the implications of our model 
for how WT  in our sample would differ under a number of counterfactual conditions 
concerning individuals expectations and uncertainty about future climate conditions in the 
absence of mitigation programs. 
P
 Simulations are necessary because the point estimates of option price are non-linear 
functions of the data and the estimated model parameters.  Equation (15), or its analogs for 
different specifications, can be used to produce point estimates of WT  (the expected value of 
) for each individual in the sample.  One can report fitted WT  at the means of the data.  An 
alternative is to report descriptive statistics for these fitted point estimates (the median and lower 
and upper quartiles) calculated across all individuals in the sample.  We provide both in Table 3. 
P
POP
 For these simulations, we employ the indirect utility-difference probit equation of Model 
EV-5 in Table 2.  The first two lines in the body of Table 3 display descriptive statistics for fitted 
expected option prices (with expected future monthly income statistics for comparison). Option 
price point estimates (WT ) range widely in the sample, with all of this variation attributable to 
differences in expected income and other individual attributes.
P
18  While a point estimate of  $228 
per month may seem high, it remains less than 5% of average expected future monthly income. 
 Note that confidence intervals for these WTP estimates are not provided.  The non-
representative sample could lead to a false sense of certainty about our predictions for WTP in 
                     
    18 As individual expected option prices are calculated, rare estimates less than zero are counted as zero. 
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the population as a whole.  With a more representative sample of data, it would be advisable to 
explore other specifications.  The asymptotically normal distributions of the maximum 
likelihood parameter estimates cause trouble when one tries to divide through by 0β  in 
calculating the option price, OP.  The mean of a ratio of normally distributed variables is 
undefined.  While a mean WTP will be observed in any finite sample, the expected value is 
technically undefined. 
 If people retained their subjective uncertainty about future average temperatures (i.e. if 
[ ]Var t  remained unchanged), but everyones expected temperature increase was just one degree 
Celsius, WT  at the data means would drop from $228 to $171.  If they expected a 2 degree 
Celsius increase, WT  would increase to $262. 
P
P
 Eliminating everyone's uncertainty about future climate (i.e. setting [ ] 0t =Var  for 
everyone, but leaving their individual [ ]E t  unchanged) would increase WT  from $228 to 
$490.  Eliminating all uncertainty and convincing everyone that there would be a temperature 
increase of exactly one degree Celsius would increase WT  from $228 only to $363.  However, 
a certain temperature increase of two degrees Celsius would boost WT  to $526 at the means of 
the data otherwise.  The magnitudes of these WT  numbers may of course have been influenced 
by the proximity of the sample period to the local hot-weather season. 
P
P
P
P
 
8.  Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
 Due to the small convenience sample used for the empirical portion of this study, the 
findings from the analysis of this survey are not conclusive.  They are, however, suggestive.  The 
derivation of a simple but rigorous model of the theoretic underpinnings of a referendum discrete 
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choice model for climate change mitigation is an important beginning.  Option prices have been 
argued to be the correct theoretical construct for cost-benefit analysis of public policies under 
uncertainty.  A simple model with state-dependent preferences with a well-defined indirect 
utility function is shown in this paper to lead to a convenient starting point for empirical 
specifications for use with respondent's subjective assessments of the expected value and 
variance of future climate conditions.   
 This degree of rigor allows the estimated model to be solved for the theoretically 
appropriate valuation construct.  However, using this formal model as a starting point for the 
empirical example quickly reveals that a model which is simply linear in the expected value and 
variance of the individuals subjective distribution of future average annual temperatures is 
dominated by richer models that allow for non-constant slopes with respect to mean and variance 
in the main index of the model.  We have examined several alternative empirical specifications 
that do a better job of fitting the data, but these do not sustain an easy, clean mapping back to the 
underlying indirect utility function.  Fortunately, the willingness to pay measures that are 
relevant to welfare analysis do not really require knowledge of the underlying indirect utility 
function.   
 Wherever the estimated parameters of our option price models are statistically 
significant, their signs are plausible.   Knowledge of the nature of heterogeneity in preferences 
with respect to climate change mitigation will be a very important consideration in the politics of 
"selling" (or derailing) climate change mitigation policies.  We have found persuasive evidence 
that, even in this small sample, the anticipated scope of climate change in the absence of 
mitigation makes a statistically significant difference in individuals' willingness to pay for 
mitigation.  Greater climate uncertainty also seems to reduce peoples willingness to incur the 
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costs of climate change mitigationmoreso when larger temperature increases are expected.   
 Further resolving the role of uncertainty about future climate in determining the strength 
of support for climate change policies should be an important item on the research agenda.  The 
results in this paper certainly suggest that, for any group that is trying to limit support for climate 
change mitigation, a campaign to amplify uncertainty about future climate conditions will lead to 
reduced support for mitigation policies.19  This is consistent with the persistent efforts of some of 
the stakeholders who will bear many of the costs of climate change mitigation to debunk 
climate change science by emphasizing how little scientists really know.   
                     
19
 This is reminiscent of the idea of optimal obfuscation put forward by Magee, et al. (1989) to explain why 
vote-maximizing strategies with endogenous politics can lead to economically inefficient solutions.   
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                                                                     Table 1 
 
                            Descriptive Statistics for Complete Estimating Sample (n = 602) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MEAN STD. DEV 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Distributions of future annual mean temperature: (degrees Fahrenheit) 
 
 [ ]E t  Subjective expected future annual mean temperature. 66.73   1.871 
 [ ]Var t  Subjective variance in future annual mean temperatures 2.237  2.307 
 [ ]H t a Subjective high guess for  future annual mean temperature 69.60   2.593 
 [ ]L t  a Subjective low guess for future annual mean temperature 64.15   1.708 
 
Incomes, Cost, and Vote: 
 
 Y Expected income in 2005                          61267.  30585.  
 c Monthly cost of policies  79.45  70.08  
 WTP? Vote for policies? (1=yes, 0=no) 0.79   
 
Respondent Attributes: 
 
 AGE Age of respondent  (17- to 23-year-old sample) 19.39    1.313    
 FEMALE Gender (1=female, 0=male) 0.4967   
 INFORM I consider myself well-informed about environmental                  4.073    1.247   
  Issues (1 =strongly disagree , 7 =strongly agree ) 
 CONSERV I consider myself to be  3.952    1.217   
  (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative) 
 IMMOBILE Fifteen to twenty years from now, I expect to live in the  4.305    1.714   
  Same region as I do now. 
  (1 = strongly disagree,7 = strongly agree) 
 RES. BIAS I suspect that the [team] conducting this study believes       5.267    1.129   
  that preventing climate change is 
  (1 = extremely unnecessary , 7 =extremely urgent ) 
  SMPL2 Membership in Fall 1997 subsample 0.3920 
   SMPL3  Membership in Fall 1998 subsample 0.4950 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a  Variable is used explicitly in an Appendix, available from the author. 
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                                                                               Table 2 
                            Constant Parameter and Systematic Varying Parameter Specifications 
                  for the Indirect Utility-Difference Function based on Expectation and Variance (EV): 
                          (n = 602; n(1)=436, n(0)=166; asymptotic t-test statistics in parentheses) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Transformation: f(x) = x-63.5 f(x) = log(x-60) 
  __________________________________________ _____________ 
 
Variable  EV-1 EV-2 EV-3 EV-4 EV-5a 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       
 log[(Y-c)/Y] 4.683 9.113 12.90 13.83 14.40 
  (2.06)** (3.77)** (4.08)** (4.32)** (4.44)** 
 
 log[(Y-c)/Y] - - -6.056 -6.638 -6.730 
 × FEMALE   (-1.60) (-1.76)* (-1.79)* 
 
 f(E[t]) 0.1774 0.3928 0.2454 0.1446 0.2115 a 
  (7.00)** (7.39)** (2.74)** (1.63) (1.28) 
 
 f(E[t]) - - 0.05374 0.05090 0.08301 a 
 × INFORM   (3.98)** (3.85)** (3.38)** 
 
 f(E[t]) - - -0.01793 -0.01758 -0.04925 a 
 × CONSERV   (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.90)* 
 
 Var[t] -0.004791 -0.01606 -0.01460 - - 
  (-0.18) (-0.27) (0.24)   
 
 f(E[t])2 - -0.02459 -0.02034 -0.02090 - 
   (-3.30)** (-2.63)** (-3.08)**  
 
 Var[t]2 - 0.01254 0.01470 - - 
   (1.87)** (2.09)**   
 
f(E[t]) × Var[t] - -0.02728 -0.03387 - - 
   (-2.26)** (-2.67)**   
 
 1/(Var[t]+1) - - - 0.5079 -1.454 
     (2.25)** (-1.51) 
 
f(E[t]) / (Var[t]+1) - - - - 1.033a 
      (1.73)* 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Max Log L -356.97 -338.93 -328.98 -330.94 -331.95 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a In Model 5, (E[t] 63.5) is replaced by (E[t]-63.5-3.5) = (E[t]-60).  This avoids the problem of taking  
the log of a negative number for the five observations where expected future average temperature is less  
than current average temperature. 
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                                                                                       Table 3 
 
                                                               Counterfactual Simulations for WT  P
                                    Descriptive Statistics Across Sample for Fitted Individual Option Prices 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 SIMULATION At Data Lower Median Upper #fitted 
  Means Quartile  Quartile WTP<$0 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Benchmark Information: 
 
 Fitted Expected Option Price 228 206 315 485 1 
 Monthly Expected Income $ 5108 $3333 5208 $5208 - 
 
Counterfactual opinions about future climate: 
 
 Original [ ]Var ; make all t [ ] * 1E t t C= + !  171 168 259 391 1 
 Original [ ]Var ; make all t [ ] * 2E t t C= + !  262 224 342 501 0 
 Original [ ]E t ; but certainty ( [ ] 0t =Var ) 490 294 449 693 0 
 [ ] * 1E t t C= + ! and [ ] 0t =Var  363 217 333 504 0 
     (i.e. everyone expects exactly t C ) * 1+ !
 [ ] * 2E t t C= + !  and [ ] 0t =Var  526 321 486 725 0 
     (i.e. everyone expects exactly t C  * 2+ !
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
NOTE:   is current annual average temperature.  Variation in fitted option prices across the sample is due to 
heterogeneity in the explanatory variables.  Number of observations with negative fitted WTP is reported because 
functional form does not restrict monthly expected Option Price to be non-negative. 
*t
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Figure 1 
 
WTP surface according to Model EV-5 
(Male; Income = $40,000, Informedness and Conservatism=neutral) 
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APPENDIX I 
 
The sizes and frequencies of the randomly assigned bids in the stated preference experiment may be of 
interest to some readers. 
 
 
 Table A1 
 
 WTP by Bid Size 
 (n = 602, n(0)=166, n(1)=436) 
 
 _________________________________________ 
 
 Bid %Yes WTP number 
   at bid 
 _________________________________________ 
 
 5 87.50 32* 
 10 84.75 59 
 15 75.00 28* 
 20 81.36 59 
 30 73.68 38* 
 35 79.31 29** 
 50 72.58 62 
 75 67.80 59 
 100 70.18 57 
 125 67.24 58 
 150 62.32 69 
 200 51.61 31** 
 300 71.43 21** 
 _________________________________________ 
 
 Overall 72.43 602 
 _________________________________________ 
 
      * bids were discontinued for the F98 instrument  
    ** bids were introduced for the F98 instrument 
 
. 
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Appendix II 
 
Alternative Specifications 
 
 
 A referee has suggested that since my specification departs from the prescriptions of my 
theoretical model beyond the first column of Table 2, it is reasonable to consider other atheoretic 
specifications as well.  This referee proposed considering models that use not an inferred 
variance measure, but the more primitive information on dispersion that is actually collected by 
the survey, which can be called [ ]H t  and [ ]L t , the respondents high guess and low guess 
concerning likely future average temperatures in his or her region.  Table A2 presents results 
from four such models, which are labeled EHL for expected value, high guess, and low 
guess.  Models EHL-1 and EHL-2 are linear models which assume homogeneous and 
heterogeneous preferences and use simply the divergences between [ ]E t , [ ]H t  and [ ]L t  and 
the 63.5 degree Fahrenheit current annual average temperature. [ ]H t  appears to be the only 
significant scope variable in the homogeneous case.  Allowing for heterogeneous preferences 
reveals that scope effects differ with informedness, degree of conservatism, and the likelihood 
that the individual will reside in the same region in the future.  However, given the non-
linearities that appear to be present in the EV models discussed in the body of this paper, we also 
consider logarithmic specifications.  Models EHL-3 and EHL-4 use a log transformation of each 
temperature measure (relative to a benchmark set at 58.5 degrees Fahrenheit to avoid negative 
arguments in the logarithms).  While none of the individual scope effects is significant in the 
model with homogeneous preferences, model EHL-4 reveals the heterogeneity that one might, 
by now, expect.  In this richer model, the index of the probit model now varies in a statistically 
significant fashion with [ ]E t  and [ ]H t . Since the maximized value of the log-likelihood 
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attained with these two (non-nested) transformation is higher in the logarithmic case, Model 
EHL-4 is preferred in this class. 
 Model EHL-4 preserves only the most significant of the interaction terms that have been 
examined.  The WTP surface that is implied by model EHL-2 is depicted in Figure A1 for males 
with neutral levels of informedness and conservatism, and a midrange probability of remaining 
in the same region in the future.  The figure requires some explanation.  There are now three 
arguments, [ ]E t , [ ]H t  and [ ]L t , so it is not possible to depict WT  as a function of all three 
simultaneously.  Instead, we display the WT  surface that the model would predict if 
P
P [ ]L t  
implicitly departs from [ ]H t  symmetrically below [ ]E t .  The surface is shown only over the 
domain where [ ] [ ]tH t E> .  The key features of the relationship continue to hold.  With certainty 
(i.e. along the diagonal in Figure A1), WT  increases at a decreasing rate with P [ ]E t .  Off the 
diagonal, as increasing uncertainty causes [ ]H t  (and [ ]L t ) to depart symmetrically more and 
more from [ ]E t , WT  declines. P
 These models are somewhat less satisfactory than those in the body of the paper because 
of the need to shift the variables by 58.5 degrees, rather than 63.5, in order to prevent the need to 
take a logarithm of a negative number, for those respondents who believe that one of the three 
statistics, [ ]E t , [ ]H t  and [ ]L t , will be less than 63.5 degrees in the future.   
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                                                   Table A2 
 
    Models using Raw Data on Expected, High Guess and Low Guess (EHL) 
        for Annual Average Temperature (n = 602; n(1)=436, n(0)=166) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Transformation: f(x) = x-63.5 f(x) = log(x-58.5) 
  _________________________ ___________________________ 
 
 Variablea EHL-1 EHL-2 EHL-3 EHL-4  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 log[(Y-c)/Y] 6.601 11.08 10.27 14.98  
  (2.79)** (3.52)** (4.15)** (4.59)**  
     
 log[(Y-c)/Y] - -6.542 - -6.973 
 × FEMALE  (-1.70)*  (-1.84)*  
     
 f(E[t]) -0.001848 -0.2129 0.2181 -0.2685  
  (-0.03) (-0.92) (0.37) (-0.14)  
     
f(E[t]) × INFORM - 0.1202 - 0.7681  
   (2.61)**  (2.14)**  
     
f(E[t]) × IMMOBILE - -0.06116 - -0.5844  
   (-1.83)*  (-2.09)**  
     
 f(H[t]) 0.1062 0.1756 0.01818 0.4753  
  (2.86)** (1.33) (0.04) (0.29)  
     
f(H[t]) × INFORM - -0.03862 - -0.6094  
   (-1.53)  (-1.94)*  
      
f(H[t]) × CONSERV - -0.01613 - -0.05016  
   (2.10)**  (-2.47)**  
     
f(H[t]) × IMMOBILE - 0.03468 - 0.5045  
   (1.87)*  (2.07)**  
     
 f(L[t]) 0.03180 0.03608 0.1896 0.1284  
  (0.65) (0.70) (0.85) (0.56)  
     
 Max Log L -352.14 -338.59 -343.43 -329.63  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Each temperature measure is expressed as a deviation from 58.5 degrees Fahrenheit, rather  
than from the current annual average temperature of 63.5 degrees Fahrenheit.  This arbitrary  
displacement ensures that no negative values are created for any of the three temperature  
measures when a few individuals anticipate any one of these temperatures (typically the 
low guess to be lower than current average. 
.
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Figure A1 
 
WTP Surface According to Model EHL-4  
(if H[t] and L[t] are symmetric around E[t]; displayed only for domain where H[t]>E[t]) 
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